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Abstract
The aim of this research is to investigate the relationship between
obesity and wages, using data for nine countries from the European Com-
munity Household Panel (ECHP) over the period 1998-2001. We improve
upon the existing literature by adopting a Quantile Regression approach
to characterize the heterogenous impact of obesity at different points of
the wage distribution. Our results show that i) the evidence obtained
from mean regression and pooled analysis hides a significant amount of
heterogeneity as the relationship between obesity and wages differs across
countries and wages quantiles and ii) cultural, environmental or insti-
tutional settings do not seem to be able to explain differences among
countries, leaving room for a pure discriminatory effect hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
Although the obesity phenomenon is more recent in Europe compared to the
US, it does create equal concern given that that its prevalence has increased
by 10-40% in most European countries over the last decade (WHO, 2003) and
obesity levels based on measured data already range from 13% to 23% (WHO,
2006). Even more worrisome is the spreading of obesity among teenagers and
children (WHO, 2006). Apart from being a debilitating condition, obesity is also
related to numerous health problems and many chronic diseases. In addition,
obesity is not only a health but also an economic phenomenon (Finkelstein et
al. 2005).
The aim of the paper is to focus on the economic side of this phenomenon by
examining the relationship between obesity and wages in a cross-national per-
spective for Europe. So far, the literature on the relationship between weight
and wages has focused on two main research topics: on one side the socioe-
conomic determinants of overweight and obesity1, on the other side the costs
associated with obesity. With respect to this last point, economists have iden-
tified two types of costs: direct and indirect costs. Generally speaking, direct
costs include health care costs related to diagnostic and treatment services,
while indirect costs are related to the value of wages lost due to inability to
work because of illness as well as earning lost due to discrimination. This last
aspect is the focus of our paper.
Starting with the pioneering work by Register and Williams (1990) several
researchers have studied the existing relationship between excess weight and
labor market outcomes.2 The vast majority of empirical evidence produced
by those studies agrees with the view that, at an individual level, obesity and
labor outcomes (wage, occupation and labor force participation) are negatively
related, although this relationship may vary across population groups. If this is
due to a pure, a priori, discrimination of obese workers or it is, instead, the result
of some economic relationship is still a matter of debate. Fall in productivity
levels (Cawley, 2000, Pagan and Davila, 1997), reduced training opportunities
caused by physical difficulties (Baum and Ford, 2004) and additional costs of the
health insurance covered by the employers and charged on wages (Bhattacharya
and Bundorf, 2005) are among the main reasons used to explain such a negative
correlation.
Although using individual data, all evidence collected by this literature is
based on a mean regression approach. This represents a major shortcoming as
1See Philipson and Posner (1999), Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002), Cutler, Glaeser and
Shapiro (2003), Chou, Grossman and Saffer (2002) for the US, Loureiro and Nayga (2005) for
OECD countries, and Sanz de Galdeano (2005) for European countries.
2See among others Averett and Korenman (1996), Pagan and Davila (1997), Cawley (2000,
2004), Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005), Brunello and d’Hombres (2007), Sousa (2005), and
Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007).
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researchers are not allowed to investigate the role of obesity at different points
of the wage distribution, and the observed average effect may, indeed, hide more
complex behaviors. In fact, it could be that obesity affects individual wage dif-
ferently at the bottom or at the top of the wage distribution.3 For example,
obesity could represent a serious problem in all those contexts where a high level
of interaction with the public is required or where an intense physical activity
is necessary. On the contrary, it may not represent a serious problem at high
level of wages or, equivalently, in all those cases where intellectual activity is
needed. Alternatively, as suggested by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), appear-
ance may count more than responsibility and managerial skills (although mainly
for women) at the top of the wage distribution. Therefore, by adopting a mean
regression approach we could miss relevant pieces of information on individual
heterogeneity that may be extremely useful for a correct understanding of the
phenomenon and for tailoring effective anti-discrimination policies.
The aim of this research is to improve upon the existing literature on two
main aspects. First, we adopt a quantile regression approach, to investigate if
and at what level of wages obesity represents a problem. Second, our analysis is
based on data from nine countries included in the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP), but differently from most work on this topic we capture
country heterogeneity by modeling the relationship between obesity and wages
country by country.4 Our results show that the evidence obtained from mean
regression and pooled analysis hides some heterogeneity as the relationship be-
tween obesity and wages differs across wage quantiles and countries. Second,
there is no evidence that the results obtained can be related to existing differ-
ences in cultural, environmental or institutional settings across countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical frame-
work and presents an overview of the literature on the relationship between
excess weight and the labor market outcome. Section 3 illustrates the data used
and reports the main descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces the empirical
strategy adopted and reports the econometric results. In section 5 we deal with
the problem of endogeneity between wages and obesity and present some results
based on Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) technique. Finally,
section 6 draws some conclusions.
3Similar concerns have been raised by Fahr (2006) who finds evidence that the body mass-
wage relation is non-linear.
4It is important to note that all the evidence we collect need to be interpreted as statistical
association rather than causal effects. However, in the last part of the paper, we try to
assess the causal effect by adopting an instrumental variable strategy in a context of quantile
regression.
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2 Empirical Relationship between Obesity and
Wages: Background and Literature Review
Following Register andWilliams (1990), Loh (1993) and Gortmaker et al. (1993)
the relationship between wages and weight has been usually modelled by means
of the traditional human capital wage equation:
Wi,t = β0+β1BMIi,t+ϕXi,t+εi,t for i = 1, .....N, t = 1, .....T. (1)
where the subscript i refers to individual, t is time, BMI is the body mass index,
defined as individual weight (measured in kilograms) divided by the square of
height (measured in metres squared), Xit is a [NT ×K] matrix of time-varying
explanatory variables, ε is the vector of residuals.
Based on equation 1 and using different data sets and estimation techniques,
studies on the U.S. data find mixed results on the relationship between wages
and obesity. In particular, Gortmaker et al. (1993) find a negative relationship
between wages and obesity but no evidence to support the hypothesis that obe-
sity differentials are confounded by health status, since controlling for health
status limitation does not change their results. Moreover, they reject the hy-
pothesis that socioeconomic origin or ability account for the obesity differential.
Averett and Korenman (1996) find that obese women have lower family income
with respect to non obese women and that differences in economic status by
BMI increase when they use a lagged weight value or restrict the sample to
women who were single or childless when the early weight was reported. Pagan
and Davila (1997) find that women pay a penalty for being obese due to labor
market discrimination, while overweight males sort themselves into jobs, via
occupational mobility, to offset this penalty.5 Conley and Glauber (2007) find
that obesity is associated with a reduction in women’s wage and income by 18%
and 25% respectively, and a reduction in women’s probability of marriage by
16%. Moreover, they find that these effects persist across the life course, affect-
ing older women as well as younger women. Baum and Ford (2004) find that
both men and women experience a persistent wage penalty over the first two
decades of their career. Cawley (2000, 2004) finds that weight lowers wages for
white women and that in absolute value this reduction is equivalent to the wage
effect of one year of education, two years of job tenure and three years of work
experience. Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) show that the significant negative
relationship between adult BMI and wages found in cross-sectional estimates
reflects only a correlation between unmeasured earning endowment and BMI,
5In this last case, male overweight workers choose jobs where they find a productivity
advantage over the non-obese or where they have a premium for undertaking more employment
related risks.
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and it disappears when controlling for endowments common to monozygotic
twins. Cawley and Danziger (2005) examine the relationship between weight
and labor market outcome for individuals older than 65. They find that after
controlling for individual fixed effects the estimates of the correlation of obesity
and different labor market outcomes is not longer significant.
Similarly, in the European context, there are country specific studies for Eng-
land, Scotland, and Wales (Sargent and Blanchflower, 1994), England (Morris,
2006), Germany (Cawley et al., 2005) and Denmark (Greve, 2005). Sargent and
Blanchflower (1994) find no relationship between earning and obesity for men
and a statistically significant inverse relationship between obesity and earnings
for women. Morris (2006) finds that BMI has a positive and significant effect
on occupational attainment for males and a negative and significant effect for
females. For Germany, Cawley et al. (2005) find that obesity is negatively
associated with wages, both for men and women, when using OLS technique.
However, once the authors control for the endogeneity using genetic factors, they
conclude that there is no significant relationship between weight and wages. For
Denmark, using information on whether the individuals’ parents have ever taken
medication related to obesity or obesity related diseases (namely hypertension
and Type 2 diabetes) and their mortality cause, Greve (2005) finds a negative
and significant relationship between BMI and the probability to be employed
for women and an insignificant relationship for men.
European wide analyses have been conducted using pooled data from the
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) by Sousa (2005), Brunello
and d’Hombres (2007), Lundborg et al. (2007) and Sanz de Galdeano (2007).
Country-by-country European analysis has, instead, been done by Fahr (2006)
and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007). Sousa (2005) focuses on the im-
pact of the BMI on labor force participation. She finds that being overweight
decreases labor force participation for women, but it increases labor force par-
ticipation for men. However, she is not able to estimate the obesity effect for
each country separately, because using the propensity score matching approach
reduces enormously the sample size. Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) find a neg-
ative and statistically significant impact of obesity on wages independently of
gender for the pooled sample of countries. Furthermore, the negative relation-
ship between obesity and wage is higher in Southern Europe than in Northern
Europe and the size of the effect of the BMI on wage depends on whether an
individual lives in an area with higher or lower than area’s average BMI, sug-
gesting that local economic and social environment does matter. Lundborg et
al. (2007) analyze the effect of obesity on employment, hours worked and hourly
wages in 10 European countries for people aged 50 and above. Pooling all the
countries, they find that obesity is negatively associated with being employed for
both men and women and with female hourly wages. Moreover, when grouping
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the countries in Nordic, Central and Southern, they find that the effects of obe-
sity on labor market outcomes differ across Europe. Sanz de Galdeano (2007)
focuses on the costs of obesity in terms of health, use of health care services and
absenteeism. She finds that obesity is negatively associated with health, espe-
cially for women and in Northern and Central European countries. Moreover,
obesity is shown to be positively associated with the demand for general practi-
tioner and specialist services. Concerning the relationship between obesity and
absenteeism, obese women in some countries are found to be absent from work
more often than healthy-weight women, while no significant effect is found for
men.
A main drawback of all these studies is that they rely on a common effect
of obesity on wages across the whole Europe or country groups. As shown by
Fahr (2006) and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007), allowing for country-
by-country analysis provides more insights into the relationship between wages
and obesity. Fahr (2006) analyzes wage penalties associates with deviation from
a social norm on BMI. He estimates an equation where log of wages is regressed
on two dummies capturing the influence of a deviation from the social norm, and
on two dummies that account for the influence of deviations from an optimal
BMI from a medical point of view. He finds that deviations of more than three
index points in body mass in the upward direction from the norm is sanctioned
with about 7% decrease in hourly wages in Austria, Greece and Spain. Garcia
and Quintana-Domeque (2007) show that there is weak evidence that obese
workers are more likely to be unemployed or tend to be more segregated in self-
employment jobs than their non-obese counterparts. Moreover, they find that
the relationship between labor market outcomes and obesity is heterogeneous
across countries and gender and it can be explained by the role of some labor
market institutions, such as collective bargaining and employer-provided health
insurance.
Overall, two main lessons can be learned from this literature review: i)
the evidence gathered on the relationship between wages and obesity is far
from being conclusive; ii) country heterogeneity plays an important role and
further analysis at country level or even at sub-region level should be undertaken
whenever data are available. At the same time, a major criticism to be raised is
that all these findings are based on ”mean” values over the wage distribution.
As also Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) have pointed out, average effect
may, indeed, hide more complex behaviors. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate
the role of obesity at different points of the wage distribution, as it could be
that obesity is related to individual wage differently at the bottom or at the
top of the wage distribution. In what follows, we fill this gap by exploring
the relationship between obesity and wages across countries and over the wage
distribution through quantile regression.
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3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP), a dataset designed and coordinated by Eurostat, the Eu-
ropean Statistical Office. The ECHP supplies a longitudinal panel of private
households and individuals across countries of the European Union over eight
consecutive years, from 1994 to 2001, with a focus on household income, liv-
ing conditions, individual health, education and employment status. Moreover,
the harmonized design of the ECHP ensures a good level of comparison across
countries and over time.6 We only consider those countries (Denmark, Belgium,
Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland) and years (1998-
2001) where information on weight and height is available. As done in previous
studies, we drop potential outliers by restricting the sample to include only in-
dividuals with BMI above 15 and below 50. Moreover, we exclude pregnant
women, and we further restrict our analysis to full-time dependent employees
aged between 18 and 65 years.7
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of BMI, Overweight and Obesity
Women Men
BMI Overweight Obesity BMI Overweight Obesity
Kg/m2 % % Kg/m
2
% %
Full Sample 23.51 21.05 6.51 25.50 42.18 9.12
Austria 23.15 20.32 4.90 25.34 38.88 9.03
Belgium 23.00 15.03 5.89 25.35 38.19 10.59
Denmark 24.27 24.94 10.19 25.41 41.13 9.45
Finland 24.45 26.45 10.05 25.80 42.77 11.23
Greece 23.43 22.37 5.03 25.86 49.81 8.04
Ireland 23.33 20.47 5.80 25.23 40.87 7.95
Italy 22.59 17.01 3.12 25.09 39.09 6.64
Portugal 24.15 24.05 8.46 25.49 42.85 8.53
Spain 22.82 16.01 4.55 25.92 44.98 11.73
Notes: Overweight and obese workers are individuals with BMI between 25 and 30 and over 30, respec-
tively as indicated by WHO.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the log hourly wage for the respon-
dent’s current job. In order to make data from different countries comparable,
we converted nominal wage into real wage using the time varying purchasing
power parity conversion index provided by the ECHP. As covariates we consider
a dummy identifying obesity (BMI>30 Kg/m2),8 along with age, education,
6For further details on the ECHP, see Peracchi (2002).
7Table A-1 in the Appendix shows the selection procedure with the number of observations
deleted in each step.
8We did not use the continuous variable BMI as done in Brunello and d’Hombres (2007)
7
training, household compositions, health status (bad or good health status),
number of days absent from work, smoking habits, private or public sector of
activity, occupation and sector of activity, insurance paid by the employer, time
and country dummies. These covariates are widely used in wage models in order
to control for systematic differences in observed characteristics between individ-
uals, as some of them may affect simultaneously weight and wages and their
effects need to be netted out.9 Table 1 provides summary statistics of the indi-
vidual BMI, overweight and obesity rates, by country and sex. Men are more
likely to be overweight and obese than women: 42.2% and 9.1% are respectively
overweight and obese, compared to 21.1% and 6.5% for women. The prevalence
of overweight and obesity varies also across countries. The table also shows that
about 10.0% of women in both Denmark and Finland are obese, compared to
3.1% in Italy. Similar differences across countries exist also for men; in Spain
the obesity rate is 11.7%, close to that in Belgium and Finland (10.6% and
11.2% respectively), and far from Italy’s rate (6.6%). Tables A-2 and A-3 in the
Appendix report the full set of summary statistics for the pooled sample and
by country.
4 Ordinary Least Squares vs Quantile regres-
sion results
In this section we report the results of the empirical analysis we have carried
out. As first step, table 2 reports the coefficients of obesity obtained from OLS
regressions for the pooled sample and for each country, by gender. For the pooled
sample, the obesity coefficient is negative for both men and women, although
statistically significant (at 1%) for women but not for men, thus suggesting the
existence of a wage penalty only for women at European level. On the contrary,
country by country estimates provide a different picture, showing the existence
of a large heterogeneity in the association between wages and weight across
European countries. Not for all countries in our dataset women seem to suffer
from a wage penalty, given that in Austria, Belgium and Portugal there is no
for the following two reasons: i) the RESET test rejects the hypothesis of linearity of the
continuous BMI variable; ii) there is a clear indication in the data that health care costs at
individual level (proxied by the number of visits to a GP) exhibit a discontinuity when the
BMI is around 30 Kg/m2, for both males and females.
9For example, for more educated people (and especially for women) education may have
a negative influence on weight due to higher frequency of weight monitoring (Wardle and
Griffith, 2001), different life-styles, lower intertemporal discount rates. Presence of children
may be associated with increase in weight and specific labor market outcomes (Lacobsen,
Pearce and Rosenbloom, 1999). Health problems are more frequent in obese people and they
may also affect labor market performance (Andreyeva, Michaud and Van Soest 2005), while
smoking is negatively correlated with labor productivity but also with weight (Molarius et al.
(1997), Evans and Montgomery (1994)).
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evidence of an association between wage and obesity. Furthermore, whenever
this association is statistically significant, the impact of the wage penalty is
rather heterogeneous across countries, ranging from -3% in Denmark to -11%
in Spain. As far as men are concerned, differences among countries are even
more striking. In fact, we observe three different clusters: Belgium, Finland,
Ireland, Portugal and Spain which confirm the result of no statistical association
from the pooled sample, Greece and Italy which show a wage penalty (-5.9%
and -5.4% respectively) and, finally, Austria and Denmark which record a wage
premium (2.9% and 3.0% respectively).10
Table 2: OLS Regression Estimates on the Mean, Pooled Sample
Women Men
Full Sample -0.047*** -0.011
Austria 0.019 0.029**
Belgium -0.023 0.006
Denmark -0.031** 0.030*
Finland -0.059*** -0.009
Greece -0.044* -0.059***
Ireland -0.059* 0.010
Italy -0.064*** -0.054***
Portugal -0.026 -0.017
Spain -0.112*** -0.016
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables include: country and time dummies, individual age, cohabitation
status (living in couple or not), presence of children under twelve in the household, health
status (bad or good health status) number of days absent from work, highest level of educa-
tion completed (primary, secondary and tertiary), sector of activity (public or private), health
insurance status (whether the health insurance is provided by the employer), sector (agri-
culture, industry and services) and occupational category (Professionals, Clerks, Agriculture
and Fishery occupations, Elementary occupations). Estimates are obtained using sample
weights. Huber-White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are adjusted in order to
take into account the presence of multiple observations for each individual.
As discussed in section 2, the whole literature on the relationship between
wage and obesity has been based on a mean regression approach, which looks
only at the role of obesity at the mean level of the wage, ignoring individual
wage heterogeneity. Indeed, it could be that obesity affects individual wages
differently across the wage distribution. A way to overcome such limitation
10In absolute values these percentages are not negligible. For example, given a coefficient
of 0.05 (as for women in the pooled sample), and assuming an annual salary of 30,000 euros,
the penalty effect amounts to about 125 euros per month. Slightly higher values are obtained
at country level for some countries (for example in Spain it reaches the highest value of 225
euros per month).
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is to adopt a quantile regression approach that allows us to characterize the
whole conditional distribution of wage. Indeed, we may expect that in the
lowest points of the wage distribution workers perform manual activities that
require effort and greater muscle mass. Similarly, in the highest points of the
wage distribution intellectual activity is needed and obesity may not represent
an issue. In the first case we should expect a positive effect of the obesity
coefficient in the left tail of the wage distribution, while in the second case a not
significant effect in the right tail. Alternatively, as suggested by Hamermesh and
Biddle (1994), appearance may count more than responsibility and managerial
skills at the top of the wage distribution (although mainly for women), and for
this reason we might expect a negative obesity coefficient at least in the right
tail of the wage distribution.
Tables 3 and 4 report the quantile regression estimates for the pooled sample,
respectively for women and men. What emerges from these results is that while
for women in table 3 the QR estimates turn out to be not very different from
the estimates computed at the mean, for men in table 4 the opposite holds. The
effect of obesity for women is negative and statistically significant at 1% along
the wage distribution, and in absolute terms slightly higher on the tails of the
distribution (-4,2% at 15th percentile and -4,4% at 85th percentile, respectively)
compared to the central part (slightly less than 4.0%).
Differently from women, the effect of obesity for men is heterogeneous across
quantiles. In particular, men in the bottom part of the wage distribution seem
to suffer from wage penalty due to obesity (-3.1% and -1.3% at 15th and 25th
percentile, respectively), while the effect is not statistically significant in the
remaining quantiles (see table 4). These last results seem to contradict both
the ”obesity as an asset” and the Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) ”appearance
theory” hypotheses.
Looking at country specific estimates in table 5, the heterogeneity in the
statistical association between wages and obesity is even more pronounced. For
women, in Ireland the wage penalty is found only in the left part of the wage
distribution, in Greece only at the center of the wage distribution, in Italy the
relationship is characterized by a reversed U-shaped curve with larger penalties
on both tails. No regular patterns can be found in countries like Denmark,
Finland and Spain, although coefficients vary quite a lot across quantiles (for
example, in Finland, while the mean effect for women is equal to -5.9%, using
quantile regression the effect ranges from -7.7% at 15th percentile to -3.4% at
75th percentile). Similar results hold for men. In summary, these findings seem
to suggest that it would be misleading to ignore the heterogeneity of the obesity
effect across countries and along the wage distribution.
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Table 3: Quantile Regressions Estimates: Pooled Sample, Women - (n. obs
34,556)
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.044***
Insurance 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.055*** 0.059***
Training 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.100*** 0.079*** 0.079***
Sickness -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
Bad Health -0.013 -0.009 -0.023* -0.034** -0.008
Age 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.031***
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private -0.116*** -0.106*** -0.089*** -0.073*** -0.061***
Couple 0.030*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.002 0.009
Children 0.007 0.008 0.012** 0.024*** 0.031***
Secondary 0.165*** 0.158*** 0.151*** 0.156*** 0.171***
Tertiary 0.293*** 0.294*** 0.316*** 0.379*** 0.422***
Smoker 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.037***
Clerks -0.116*** -0.129*** -0.151*** -0.194*** -0.203***
AgrFishery -0.185*** -0.219*** -0.284*** -0.367*** -0.385***
Elementary 0.197*** -0.223*** -0.255*** -0.310*** -0.321***
Agriculture -0.145*** -0.115*** -0.154*** -0.094*** -0.048**
Industry 0.084*** 0.062*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.030***
Constant -0.887*** -0.616*** -0.347*** -0.183*** -0.009
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables include also country and time dummies.
4.1 Pure wage discrimination or alternative explanations?
Based on the results presented in the previous section, can we argue that a pure
discriminatory effect exists, or rather is it the result of model misspecification
due to omitted variables? Baum and Ford (2004) suggest three possible sources
of misspecification: i) losses in productivity due to health problems; ii) agents’
myopic behavior; iii) provision of health insurance by employers who discount
higher health care costs for obese workers in the form of lower wages. We
expect that if differences in wages between obese and non obese workers are due
to one of the above mentioned reasons, once controlled for them, the obesity
coefficient should become statistically insignificant. Therefore, in eq.1 we add
a set of variables that should take into account the mentioned hypotheses. In
this section we test the significance of these hypotheses. Results are reported
in table 6.
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Table 4: Quantile Regression Estimates: Pooled Sample, Men - (n. obs 54,074)
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.031*** -0.013** 0.004 0.009 -0.003
Insurance 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.057*** 0.057***
Training 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.087***
Sickness -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001** -0.001 -0.000
Bad Health -0.087*** -0.065*** -0.081*** -0.052*** -0.042***
Age 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.030***
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private -0.067*** -0.050*** -0.029*** -0.010 0.000
Couple 0.073*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.087***
Children 0.019*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.022***
Secondary 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.134*** 0.134***
Tertiary 0.235*** 0.245*** 0.282*** 0.340*** 0.351***
Smoker -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.018*** -0.009* -0.005
Clerk -0.100*** -0.120*** -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.166***
AgrFishery -0.130*** -0.145*** -0.176*** -0.197*** -0.213***
Elementary -0.155*** -0.171*** -0.194*** -0.209*** -0.228***
Agriculture -0.255*** -0.196*** -0.154*** -0.116*** -0.134***
Industry 0.082*** 0.060*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.022***
Constant 0.033*** 0.058*** 0.087*** 0.104*** 0.116***
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables include also country and time dummies.
Productivity hypothesis In order to test whether obese workers earn
less than non obese workers because they are less productive, we interact the
obesity dummy with a productivity proxy, namely the number of days of absence
from work due to sickness. The ECHP asks respondents to report the number
of days they were absent from work during the last four working weeks because
of illness or other reasons. It should be noted that this measure includes absent
episodes due to illness and any other reason so it is not possible to isolate
the impact of obesity-related illness episodes. Looking at table 6 (row 2), for
the pooled sample we find that health limitations do not affect obese workers’
wages differently from non obese workers’ and the obesity wage penalties remain
unchanged for both men and women suggesting that obesity influences wages
through a channel different from productivity losses due to health limitations.11
11We should keep in mind that obesity might affect productivity in ways that are not as eas-
ily measured. The negative effect of obesity on appearance, for example, can affect confidence
and communication, thereby influencing productivity. Mobius and Rosenblat (2004) estimate
that confidence accounts for approximately 20% of the beauty premium. Persico, Postlewaite
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Table 5: Quantile Regression Estimates: Obesity Coefficients
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Austria 0.029 0.021 -0.020 0.068* 0.038*
Belgium -0.009 -0.020 -0.049 -0.014 0.011
Denmark -0.046** -0.051** -0.037** -0.049*** -0.046***
Finland -0.077*** -0.039** -0.046*** -0.034* -0.042**
Greece -0.023 -0.051* -0.049 0.012 0.009
Ireland -0.104** -0.064* -0.066** -0.045 -0.033
Italy -0.067* -0.044 -0.031 -0.049 -0.071**
Portugal 0.010 -0.001 -0.025 -0.035 0.022
Spain -0.105* -0.101** -0.087** -0.114*** -0.131***
Men
Austria 0.009 0.027* 0.042** 0.041* 0.043*
Belgium 0.019 0.030 0.004 -0.031 -0.043*
Denmark 0.027 0.029 0.039** 0.023 0.042*
Finland -0.039* -0.014 0.011 0.009 0.021
Greece -0.065** -0.042* -0.024 -0.029 -0.030
Ireland -0.004 -0.009 0.021 0.022 0.048
Italy -0.068** -0.063*** -0.042*** -0.040* -0.029
Portugal -0.072*** -0.006 0.008 0.024 -0.015
Spain -0.023 -0.051** -0.022 -0.016 0.002
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
Myopic behavior hypothesis According to the agents’ myopic behav-
ior hypothesis, obese workers heavily discount the future by caring less about
obesity-related health problems and invest less in human capital accumulation
(less training), thus generating a flatter wage profile. We test this hypothesis by
interacting the obese dummy with the training dummy. The results show that
while investment in training significantly increases wages for men and women,
the interaction obesity-training is not significant for women and positive and
significant for men, while the obesity coefficients (as shown in table 6, row 3)
are slightly larger in absolute values for men and are virtually unchanged for
women with respect to the base model (as reported in table 6, row 1). This in-
dicates that, at least for women, agents’ myopic behavior is not what drives the
negative relationship between weight and wages. On the contrary, for men by
and Silverman (2004) hypothesize that height increases the chances that teenagers participate
in social activities, such as nonacademic clubs and sports. This participation, in turn, helps
them to learn skills that are rewarded by employers and might enhance productivity.
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netting out the myopic behavior effect, the wage penalty due to obesity seems
to be larger.12
Health care insurance costs hypothesis We investigate whether the
observed wage differential between obese and non obese in European countries
can be explained by the costs of health care insurance covered by the employer
and charged on employees’ wage. We test this hypothesis by interacting the
obesity dummy with the health insurance dummy and we find that the inter-
action coefficient is positive but not significant both for men and women. As
found for men in the myopic behavior hypothesis, controlling for health care
insurance costs the negative association between wage and obesity slightly in-
creases for the female group (table 6, row 4). Overall, this result is not surprising
given that the countries in our sample are characterized by universal coverage of
health care services and that health insurance provided by the employer covers
additional services not included in the public insurance. As for the previous
hypotheses, this finding seems to indicates that health care insurance costs are
not able to explain the negative relationship between weight and wages.
To complete this analysis, we have run a new model in which all these
hypotheses have been considered jointly. Results are reported in the last row of
each panel in table 6.13 Concerning men, we observe an increase in the wage
penalty in the first two percentiles, while for the others the effect remains not
significant. Also for women, we observe an increase in the wage penalty in all
the quantiles except the first one which is not longer statistical significant.
Given that none of these hypotheses seem to be able to capture entirely the
significance of the obesity coefficients, our findings could suggest the existence
of a pure discriminatory effect, although not conclusive in the sense we are not
estimating a causal effect.
4.2 The role of labor market institutions
Finally, we try to assess whether labor market institutions may help to under-
stand the different results obtained in terms of the relationship between obesity
and wages across countries by means of three indicators of labor market regula-
tions: trade union density, bargaining governability, and degree of employment
protection legislation (EPL) as reported in table A-7 in the appendix. In par-
ticular, we expect that in countries with the highest levels of union density,
bargaining governability and EPL, where the wage setting is more controlled
12Baum and Ford (2004) use the experience variable as a proxy for engagement in training
activities. Our data allow one to use directly the variable training. We also re-estimate the
model interacting obesity with experience, but the results do not change (results not shown).
13The full set of results with all other covariates and results country by country are available
upon request.
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Table 6: Quantile Regression Estimates with Interactions, Obesity Coefficients
Pooled Sample
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Base model -0.042*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.044***
Base + Sickness interaction -0.040*** -0.048*** -0.055*** -0049*** -0.049***
Base + Training interaction -0.035* -0.050*** -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.050***
Base + Insurance interaction -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.064*** -0.044*** -0.048***
Base + all 3 interactions -0.036 -0.054*** -0.061*** -0.042** -0.049***
Men
Base model -0.031*** -0.013** 0.004 0.009 -0.003
Base + Sickness interaction -0.030*** -0.014** 0.000 0.007 -0.006
Base + Training interaction -0044*** -0.024*** -0.009 -0.013 -0.012
Base + Insurance interaction -0.032*** -0.014* -0.009 -0.005 -0.020*
Base + all 3 interactions -0.040*** -0.018*** -0.012 -0.015 -0.022*
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: The regressions include all the covariates table2.
and employers and firms do not play any role in the wage setting, the relation-
ship between obesity and wages is not significant or small in size. Unfortunately,
we cannot empirically test these hypotheses in a regression framework for two
main reasons: i) the ECHP data set does not provide union participation at
individual level; ii) data on level of union density, bargaining governability, and
EPL are obviously collected at country level and time invariant. However, we
can provide an indirect evidence of the relationship between labor market in-
stitutions and wage penalty differences across countries by means of Spearman
correlation coefficients.14
Table 7 shows that the ranking of countries according to the size of the
obesity effect as obtained in Table 5) does not seem to have any correspondence
with the ranking of countries according to the three labor market indicators.
The only exception is represented by the EPL indicator for men, that shows
coefficients above 0.7 in some percentiles. However, the non monotonicity of
these effects makes it difficult to draw any economic interpretation. Overall, it
14Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007) analyze the relationship between labor outcomes
(employment and wage) and collective bargaining coverage (the number of employees covered
by a collective agreement over the total number of employees) through a simple graphical
analysis, where they plot labor market institutions indicators on the X-axis and obesity labor
market outcomes on the Y-axis. They find a positive association between collective bargaining
coverage and the probability of being unemployed with respect to being employed for women,
but no clear relationship for men. Moreover they find a strong positive association between
collective bargaining coverage and wage gaps for women but no clear relationship for men.
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is plausible to conclude that country specific labor market regulations do not
play any role in explaining the differences in results across countries.
Table 7: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients by Quantiles
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Union Density 0.017 -0.171 -0.079 -0.196 -0.033
Bargaining Governability -0.053 -0.229 -0.426 -0.030 -0.042
EPL -0.350 -0.229 -0.204 -0.088 -0.15
Men
Union Density -0.567 -0.500 -0.517 -0.067 -0.283
Bargaining Governability -0.292 -0.304 -0.601 -0.732 -0.470
EPL 0.733 0.367 0.700 0.283 0.733
Note: Each cell in the table reports the Spearman correlation coefficient between the obesity
coefficient for each quantile at country level and the corresponding ranking for each labor
market indicator. For example, the value reported at the cross between the 15th quantile
and the row with union density represents the Spearman correlation coefficient between the
obesity coefficients recorded for each country in that quantile and the ranking of the union
density variable.
5 Dealing with the endogeneity problem
As already discussed in the previous sections, the results produced so far can-
not be interpreted as causal relationship from obesity to wages. This is because
OLS may yield biased estimates for at least three reasons. First, unobservable
individual effects associated to genetic and non-genetic factors, such as abil-
ity and parental background, might be correlated both with earning and the
respondent’s body mass index. Second, a problem of reverse causality might
exist. For instance, the quality and the quantity of food might determine how
an individual behaves, her level of productivity and inventiveness at work, and
her earning potentialities, but, at the same time, individual working position
and wages might influence her quality and quantity of food. Finally, the BMI
can be measured with errors, as researchers rely on self reported measures of
weight and height. In this case, the error term is correlated with the variable of
interest by construction, generating inconsistent estimates.15
15Using the Third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III), which
contains measures of true and self-reported weight and height (and therefore, BMI), to correct
the self-reports of weight and height in the NLSY, Cawley (2004) shows that this does not
seem to be a major problem. He finds that even if women tend to underreport their weights
but not their heights, using reported BMI instead of corrected BMI does not alter significantly
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Several studies have dealt with the endogeneity problem using alternative
identification strategies. Sargent and Blanchflower (1994), Gortmaker et al.
(1993), and Averett and Korenman (1996) address reverse causality by replac-
ing the contemporaneous BMI with its lagged value. However, the validity of
this strategy relies on the hypothesis of independence between the lagged BMI
and the residual, which is unlikely to be true especially in presence of unob-
served individual effects. Baum and Ford (2004), Cawley (2004), Cawley and
Danziger (2005) and Sanz de Galdeano (2007) use the fixed effect estimators
to control for unobservable individual effects. This identification strategy does
show some drawbacks. In particular, as also noted by Garcia and Quintana-
Domeque (2007), a fixed effect strategy does not solve the reverse causality
problem. In addition, there is a clear trade-off between consistency of the es-
timates obtained with longer panel and plausibility of the unobservables’ time
invariance.
Many researchers have instead adopted an instrumental variable approach
to deal with the problem of endogeneity, using different instruments. Pagan
and Davila (1997) choose as instrument indicators of health problems, such as
self-esteem and family poverty. Cawley (2000 and 2004) adopts the BMI of
“biological” family members (including parents’, siblings’ and children’ body
mass index) and Cawley et al. (2005) use the weight of a child or of a parent,
under the assumption that the BMI of a biological family member does not
affect the respondent’s wage directly. Morris (2006) adopts the average BMI
and prevalence of obesity across individuals living in the same health authority
area as instruments. Greve (2005) uses information on whether the individ-
uals’ parents have ever taken medication related to obesity or obesity related
diseases (namely hypertension and Type 2 diabetes) and their mortality status.
Lundborg et al. (2007) choose as instruments the presence of other obese per-
sons in the household, being an oldest child, and having sisters only. Finally,
Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) solve the endogeneity problem by considering
the “biological” BMI (computed as average of all household members’ BMI)
as instrument. The main drawback with the IV approach is that two condi-
tions have to be satisfied to ensure the validity of an instrument. It must be
the estimates. Unfortunately, we do not have the possibility to apply a similar correction due
to the lack of data on true measures of weight and height in Europe. However, we have
no reason to believe that reporting errors differ over time and across countries. In order
to assess the validity of this assumption, Sanz de Galdeano (2007) has compared aggregate
obesity rates based on objective measures obtained by the WHO Global Database on Body
Mass Index with the corresponding figures derived from the ECHP self-reported information
on height and weight. She finds that the correlation coefficient between the ECHP and the
WHO Global Database measures of obesity prevalence is reasonably high: 0.76 (p < 0.05)
for men and 0.96 (p < 0.01) for women. Similar results are obtained when computing the
Spearman rank correlation coefficients. Based on this evidence, in our analysis we will assume
that the bias due to measurement errors is the same across countries and through time.
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correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the outcome’s
residuals. While the first condition can be easily tested, with respect to the
second condition only indirect evidence can be provided given that no formal
procedure exists to test for absence of correlation between the instrument and
wage residuals.
Finally, in order to overcome the difficulty of finding suitable instruments,
Sousa (2005) uses a propensity score matching approach. However, since this
procedure implies to find comparable individuals within the same dataset it
might lead to reduce enormously the sample size. A similar problem is found by
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) and Conley and Glauber (2007) when using
information on siblings and twins to remove the common household effect due to
both genetic and non-genetic factors, given that the number of households with
at least two children living in is limited and, therefore, it may create problems
of representativeness.
With the data in our hands, we believe that the IV approach is the most con-
vincing (among those mentioned above) to deal with the endogeneity problem,
despite its drawback concerning the choice of the instrument. In order to better
understand the limit of “biological” BMI we should notice that the residual of
the wage equation (1) can be decomposed as:
εi,t = Gi,t +NGi,t + νi,t (2)
where Gi,t is the genetic component, NGi,t is the non genetic component and
νi,t is a residual, i.i.d. over individuals and time.
Several studies reviewed in Cawley (2004) have shown that the correlation
of weight within household members is due to genetic factors rather than to
environmental influences. More specifically, according to Grilo and Pogue-Geile
(1991), environmental experiences shared among family members are not im-
portant in determining individual differences in weight. Therefore it is unlikely
that biological BMI is correlated with the unobserved non genetic errors and it
can be safely assumed that Corr(bBMIi,t, NGi,t) = 0. Unfortunately, the error
terms of the wage and obesity equations could be still correlated if unobserv-
able genetic factors affecting individual earnings are correlated to transmitted
genetic variation in weight (Corr(bBMIi,t, Gi,t) 6= 0), although this event may
not be very likely when analyzing labor market outcomes (Cawley, 2004).
Ideally, the best strategy to control for unobserved genetic factors is to use
same-sex siblings or twins’ weight as an instrument. In practice, apart from the
reduction in sample size mentioned above, it has some additional drawbacks: i)
it is not possible, in all surveys, to identify siblings because they may have left
the original households; ii) in our specific case, it is likely that if they live in the
same household it is because they are still at school and/or not working, thus
not useful for identifying the relationship of interest.
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In an effort to add robustness to our previous results and to compare them
with what has been presented in the literature so far, here below we replicate
our analysis by employing an IV approach. With the available data, the best
instrument we can adopt is the “biological” BMI, as used by Brunello and
d’Hombres (2007). This instrument averages out all the available individual
body mass index of the family members biologically related who completed the
questionnaire.
5.1 Results from the IV Quantile Regression (IVQR) ap-
proach
In this section we extend the quantile analysis run in the previous sections
with the instrumental variable approach by adopting an IVQR. 16 Empirical
contribution based on IVQR are relatively new in the literature.17 and, to our
knowledge, this is the first study which applies IVQR to analyze the relationship
between wage and obesity. Tables 8 reports the IVQR estimates for the pooled
sample and country by country, respectively for women and men.18
For the pooled sample IVQR estimates turn out to be very different from
the QR estimates. The obesity estimate for women is significant and very large
in size (25%) only in the highest quantile, while it was significant all along
the distribution and much lower in the QR case. Similarly, we find striking
differences between IVQR and QR for men. In fact, while in the QR case obesity
penalty was significant below the 25th percentile, with the IVQR approach it
turns out to be significant starting at the 75th percentile. As for the pooled
results, country by country IVQR estimates are very different from the QR
estimates, both in terms of coefficients’ magnitude, statistical significance and
quantile of interest.
Obviously, the differences between QR and IVQR estimates may arise from
the combination of two sources. The first, and most obvious, has to do with
the reduction of the sample size, due to the construction of the instrument (see
16For an exhaustive presentation of the IVQR model see Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005).
17Abadie, Angrist and Imbens (2002) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) use IVQR to
study the effect of the Job Training Partnership Program Act on the distribution of earnings;
Arias, Hallok and Sosa-Escudero (2001) estimate the family returns to education at different
quantiles of the conditional distribution of wages.
18These IVQR results have been obtained using the MATLAB code kindly provided by
Christian Hansen is his web page http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/christian.hansen/research/
and extended to allow for interactions between the endogenous variable and regressors. Un-
fortunately, we have not been able to estimate the model with interactions due to convergence
problems of the loss function. However, this should not represent a problem for the validity
of our line of reasoning, given that the results presented until now have shown that adding
interactions hardly changes the obesity coefficients, and in the few cases where this happens
the estimates are always larger in absolute value. Therefore the IVQR estimates without
interactions can be interpreted as lower bounds of the true effect and the results presented
here have to be compared to the base model, as reported in row 1 of each panel in table 6.
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Table 8: IV Quantile Regressions Estimates: Obesity Coefficients
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Full Sample 0.035 -0.000 0.016 -0.082 -0.253***
Austria (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)
Belgium 0.025 0.010 0.007 -0.143 -0.062***
Denmark 0.036 0.014 -0.010** -0.013 -0.019
Finland -0.018 -0.051 -0.017*** -0.007** 0.003
Greece (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)
Ireland -0.274 -0.040 -0.116* -0.030*** -0.020
Italy (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)
Portugal -0.049 0.102 -0.026 -0.074** 0.088
Spain -0.796 -0.035* -0.033*** -0.065*** -0.004
Men
Full Sample -0.055 0.010 -0.118 -0.195** -0.219*
Austria (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)
Belgium (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)
Denmark -0.010 -0.010 0.042 0.042 -0.018
Finland -0.181 0.097 -0.067*** 0.063** -0.026**
Greece 0.000 0.161 0.001 -0.068 -0.007
Ireland 0.017 -0.037 -0.044 -0.065 -0.288
Italy 0.028 -0.026** -0.044 -0.102** -0.035
Portugal (a) (a) (a) (a) (a)
Spain 0.000 -0.027 -0.009 -0.009* -0.012***
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
(a) Estimate is not reported since the instrument is not significant in the first stage regres-
sion.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroschedas-
ticity using a Gaussian kernel and a simple rule of thumb bandwidth (Powell, 1986).
table A-1 in the appendix). The second has to do with the different estimation
technique (QR vs IVQR). In order to separate these two effects, we have first
compared the QR estimates based on the unrestricted sample with the QR
estimates based on the restricted sample and then these latter with the IVQR
estimates. As expected, comparing the unrestricted QR estimates (see tables
3, 4, 5) with the restricted QR estimates reported in table 9 we can see that
selection bias determines sizeable differences both in magnitude and significance
across the two samples.
In fact, it must be noticed that in the case of single households with deceased
parents, couples with no children, couples with children aged less than sixteen,
or households whose components are not biologically related (step, adopted
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Table 9: Quantile Regression Estimates for the Restricted Sample: Obesity
Coefficients
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Full Sample -0.047* -0.053*** -0.060*** -0.041** -0.012**
Austria -0.014 0.093*** 0.109*** 0.179*** 0.147***
Belgium 0.082 0.063 -0.071** -0.033 0.032
Denmark -0.055** -0.087** -0.078*** -0.083*** -0.044***
Finland -0.047 -0.017 -0.069** 0.052 0.014
Greece 0.372** 0.062 0.026 0.101** 0.080**
Ireland -0.083 -0.100*** -0.083*** -0.016 0.028
Italy 0.092** 0.078** 0.004 -0.019 -0.034
Portugal -0.109* -0.061* -0.127*** -0.151*** -0.165***
Spain -0.133** -0.095 -0.050* -0.071** -0.135*
Men
Full Sample -0.017 -0.010 0.002 -0.003 0.002
Austria -0.116*** 0.020 -0.108*** -0.051*** -0.088***
Belgium -0.012 0.021 -0.007 -0.033 -0.051**
Denmark -0.003 0.002 -0.021 0.005 0.007
Finland 0.003 -0.024 0.011 0.016 0.011
Greece 0.414*** 0.186*** 0.030 0.053 0.009
Ireland -0.071*** -0.072** -0.041 -0.027 -0.046
Italy -0.013 -0.031 -0.055*** -0.043** -0.039*
Portugal 0.016 0.096*** 0.144*** 0.181*** 0.181***
Spain -0.031 -0.037 -0.081*** -0.038 -0.050**
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
(a) Estimate is not reported since the instrument is not significant in the first stage regres-
sion.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroschedas-
ticity using a Gaussian kernel and a simple rule of thumb bandwidth (Powell, 1986).
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and foster child, son and daughter in law, or just household’s components not
related), it is not possible to calculate the biological BMI and thus these obser-
vations need to be excluded from the sample. In our specific case, this procedure
leads to a sharp reduction of the observations from 88,630 to 34,868.19 As noted
by Brunello and d’Hombres (2007) this could lead to select a non random sample
of the population. Indeed, comparing the initial sample to the restricted sample
we actually find that, while the average BMI in the two samples is very close,
individuals in the restricted sample are on average younger, less educated, with
lower average wage and belong to larger households. Moreover, individuals in
Southern Europe countries have a higher probability of being included in the
restricted sample because these countries are characterized by larger household
size with respect to Northern Europe countries. In order to test whether this
endogenous selectivity is affecting our estimates, we use a two-step approach
as suggested by Wooldrige (2002) and applied also by Brunello and d’Hombres
(2007). Differently from Brunello and d’Hombres (2007), we find that the se-
lection bias correction does affect the magnitude of the coefficients for both
men and women and, moreover, the Mills ratios are statistically significant.
This result casts some doubts on the representativeness of the restricted sam-
ple.20 Finally, comparing table 8 with table 9, we can see that differences in the
estimates are stressed even further when adopting the instrumental variable ap-
proach. In conclusion, in the light of this lack of robustness in the estimates, and
the concern around the instrument adopted, the only message we feel to support
when using ECHP data is that caution should be taken when interpreting the
relationship between obesity and wages as causal.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the statistical association between obesity
and wages along the wage distribution and, contrary to most work on this
topic, we have taken care of the existing country heterogeneity by modeling the
relationship between obesity and wages country by country. In the first part
of the paper we have produced evidence of a negative statistical relationship,
computed at the mean, between wages and obesity, and that this relationship is
far from being homogeneous across countries and across wage quantiles. These
results show that the mean and quantile approaches lead to different interpreta-
tion of the phenomenon under scrutiny, partly in line with the results obtained
by Fahr (2006) and Garcia and Quintana-Domeque (2007).
Considering the pooled data, the relationship seems to be negative and signif-
19See table A-1 for the steps of the selection procedure. Moreover, the descriptive statistics
of the reduced sample are reported in Table A-4.
20Results are available upon request.
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icant all over the distribution for women and negative and significant only in the
bottom part of the distribution for men, suggesting that males with less reward-
ing jobs are also more hit by obesity status. Furthermore, it was not possible
to identify common patterns across countries that could be interpreted as en-
vironmental, cultural or institutional factors affecting the relationship between
wages and obesity as instead suggested by Brunello and d’Hombres (2007).
We have also shown that this negative relationship holds even after control-
ling for lack of productivity due to health problems, agents’ myopic behavior,
and provision of health insurance by employers, thus suggesting that residual
wage differences due to employer discrimination may be called into question.
Finally, in an attempt to control for endogeneity and to interpret our esti-
mates as causal relationships, we have employed an IVQR technique. Unfortu-
nately, the results we obtain can hardly be considered as conclusive for two main
reasons: i) we can not prove that the instrument we have chosen is orthogonal
with the error term in the wage equation, and ii) the construction of the in-
strument imposes a significant and non-random cut in our sample that prevent
us from comparing the QR and IVQR estimates. In conclusion, in the light of
this lack of robustness in the estimates, and the concern around the instrument
adopted, the only message we feel to support, when using ECHP data, is that
caution should be taken when interpreting the relationship between obesity and
wages as causal.
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Table A-1: Sample Selection from full ECHP sample, 1998− 2001
Panel A: Sample Size for OLS and QR Panel B: Sample Size for IVQR
298,966 Initial Sample, 1998-2001 298,966 Initial Sample, 1998-2001
291,162 Observations (90,539 individuals) 291,162 Observations (90,539 individuals)
7,804 Observations dropped with valid BMI in the Initial Sample 7,804 Observations dropped with valid BMI in the Initial Sample
290,780 Selection for BMI between 15 and 50 290,780 Selection for BMI between 15 and 50
167 Observations Dropped BMI<15 167 Observations Dropped BMI<15
215 Observations Dropped BMI>50 215 Observations Dropped BMI>50
287,169 Selection for no Pregnant Women 287,169 Selection for no Pregnant Women
3,611 Observations Dropped 3,611 Observations Dropped
115,995 Selection for construction of sample with biological BMI
171,174 Observations Dropped for
a. Respondent Living Alone (37,348)
b. Respondent Living Alone in couple without children
or in a couple with children aged <17 (122,768)
c. Respondent for which was not possible to calculate the BMI because of one
of the following relations with the other household components (2,728):
c1. step/adopted/foster child
c2. step/adopted/foster siblings
c3. son/daughter in law
c4. not related
d. Respondent for which was not possible to calculate the BMI
because of missing information about the relation (8,330)
228,191 Selection for sample aged 18− 65 94,757 Selection for sample aged 18− 65
5,915 Observations Dropped < 18 2,616 Observations Dropped < 18
53,063 Observations Dropped > 65 18,662 Observations Dropped > 65
130,139 Selection for no Part-Time 52,615 Selection for no Part-Time
98,052 Observations Dropped 42,142 Observations Dropped
99,943 Selection for sample without 37,858 Selections for sample without
outliers in the log hourly wage outliers in the log hourly wage
29,639 Observations Dropped (log hourly wage < 1st percentile) 14,751 Observations Dropped (log hourly wage <st percentile)
557 Observations Dropped (log hourly wage < 99th percentile) 6 Observations Dropped (log hourly wage > 99th percentile)
88,630 Selection for sample with no missing data in the covariates 34,868 Selection for sample with no missing data in the covariates
10,422 Observations Dropped 2,990 Observations Dropped
34,556 Final Sub-Sample Women 12,594 Final Sub-Sample Women
54,074 Final Sub-Sample Men 22,274 Final Sub-Sample Men
3
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Table A-2: Descriptive Statistics, Pooled Sample
Unrestricted Sample Restricted Sample
Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log Hourly Wage 1.80 0.47 1.94 0.46 1.73 0.55 1.86 0.55
Hourly Wage 6.76 3.27 7.67 3.57 6.53 3.66 7.45 4.27
BMI 23.51 3.87 25.50 3.37 23.48 3.99 25.48 3.29
bBMI (a) (a) (a) (a) 24.77 3.25 24.54 3.29
Height 163.82 6.44 175.18 7.57 163.29 6.44 174.37 7.44
Weight 63.03 10.55 78.29 11.66 62.49 10.37 77.49 11.17
Sickness 1.21 4.42 0.76 3.33 1.01 4.01 0.73 3.30
Training 0.40 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.46
Private 0.61 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.63 0.48 0.73 0.44
Insurance 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46
Age 37.17 10.64 38.32 10.99 36.23 10.37 38.15 11.23
Couple 0.62 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.46
Children 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47 0.37 0.48
Primary 0.31 0.46 0.40 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.45 0.50
Secondary 0.40 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.35 0.48
Tertiary 0.29 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.19 0.39
Bad Health 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
Smoker 0.25 0.43 0.37 0.48 0.24 0.43 0.39 0.49
Professionals 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45 0.22 0.41
Clerks 0.39 0.49 0.19 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.20 0.40
AgrFishery 0.07 0.26 0.26 0.44 0.09 0.28 0.26 0.44
Elementary 0.15 0.36 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.28 0.25 0.43
Agriculture 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16
Industry 0.19 0.39 0.40 0.49 0.21 0.41 0.42 0.49
Services 0.70 0.46 0.49 0.50 0.72 0.45 0.49 0.50
Obs. 34,556 54,074 12,594 22,274
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Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics by Country, Unrestricted Sample
Denmark Belgium Ireland Italy
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log
Hourly Wage 2.12 0.26 2.18 0.33 2.04 0.29 2.13 0.32 2.01 0.40 2.16 0.42 1.93 0.39
Hourly Wage 8.62 2.04 9.29 2.77 8.05 2.37 8.83 2.90 8.12 3.65 9.49 4.05 7.42 3.15
BMI 24.27 3.94 25.41 3.44 23.00 3.69 25.35 3.80 23.33 3.74 25.23 3.40 22.59 3.38
Height 167.01 5.91 180.24 6.94 165.72 6.24 177.43 7.07 164.37 6.68 176.82 7.25 162.89 6.51
Weight 67.73 11.59 82.58 12.17 63.15 10.48 79.85 13.11 62.94 10.12 78.88 11.68 59.85 8.88
Sickness 1.70 4.58 0.86 2.94 1.66 5.28 1.17 4.27 0.87 3.64 0.43 2.21 1.07 4.03 0.64 2.95
Training 0.88 0.33 0.82 0.3 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.71 0.46 0.74 0.44 0.55 0.50 0.68 0.47
Insurance 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.40 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.12 0.33 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.24 0.42
Age 39.91 10.70 40.21 11.44 37.12 9.35 39.69 9.84 32.87 10.59 36.15 11.57 38.22 10.35 39.13 10.65
Couple 0.85 0.36 0.81 0.40 0.69 0.46 0.7 0.42 0.38 0.49 0.57 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.66 0.47
Children 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48
Primary 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.11 0.32 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.50
Secondary 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.43 0.49
Tertiary 0.33 0.47 0.29 0.45 0.56 0.50 0.39 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31
Bad Health 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17
Smoker 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.22 0.41 0.31 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.35 0.48
Professionals 0.48 0.50 0.43 0.49 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.19 0.40
Clerks 0.39 0.49 0.11 0.32 0.26 0.44 0.11 0.32 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.38 0.43 0.50 0.27 0.45
AgrFishery 0.02 0.13 0.23 0.42 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.28 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.25 0.43
Elementary 0.10 0.30 0.20 0.40 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.28 0.45 0.13 0.34 0.22 0.41
Agriculture 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.19
Industry 0.11 0.31 0.30 0.46 0.09 0.29 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.420.49 0.21 0.40 0.39 0.49
Service 0.70 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.78 0.41 0.55 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.53 0.50
OBS. 3,189 4,048 2,504 4,020 2,235 3,904 5,837 9,754
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Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd.)
Greece Spain Portugal
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log
Hourly Wage 1.64 0.45 1.80 0.45 1.88 0.50 1.99 0.46 1.41 0.54 1.51 0.49
Hourly Wage 5.73 3.03 6.75 3.39 7.40 3.93 8.13 4.04 4.84 3.44 5.18 3.38
BMI 23.43 3.56 25.86 3.13 22.82 3.53 25.92 3.50 24.15 4.25 25.49 3.17
Height 165.09 5.33 176.19 6.79 162.70 6.22 173.27 7.24 160.79 5.86 170.36 6.67
Weight 63.81 9.76 80.25 10.40 60.33 9.27 77.80 11.36 62.30 10.41 73.98 10.06
Sickness 0.65 2.97 0.55 2.31 0.96 4.14 0.74 3.64 1.16 4.83 0.80 3.88
Training 0.12 0.33 0.16 0.37 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38
Private 0.63 0.48 0.64 0.48 0.70 0.46 0.81 0.39 0.75 0.43 0.84 0.37
Insurance 0.32 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.18 0.38 0.22 0.42
Age 35.86 9.73 39.30 10.88 35.81 10.17 37.95 11.02 35.74 11.00 36.19 11.47
Couple 0.60 0.49 0.66 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.48
Children 0.33 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.35 0.48
Primary 0.21 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.52 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.75 0.43
Secondary 0.47 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35
Tertiary 0.31 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.47 0.50 0.29 0.45 0.18 0.39 0.11 0.31
Bad Health 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22
Smoker 0.34 0.47 0.54 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.43 0.50 0.13 0.33 0.35 0.48
Professionals0.33 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.38 0.49 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.17 0.37
Clerks 0.46 0.50 0.26 0.44 0.37 0.48 0.16 0.37 0.35 0.48 0.18 0.38
AgrFishery 0.08 0.26 0.24 0.43 0.05 0.21 0.30 0.46 0.17 0.37 0.36 0.48
Elementary 0.13 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.19 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.45
Agriculture 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18
Industry 0.17 0.37 0.33 0.47 0.17 0.37 0.46 0.50 0.30 0.46 0.51 0.50
Services 0.82 0.38 0.66 0.47 0.81 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.67 0.47 0.46 0.50
OBS. 3,044 5,014 4,369 8,646 5,795 8,241
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Table A-3: Descriptive Statistics by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd.)
Austria Finland
Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log Hourly Wage 1.89 0.33 2.07 0.32 1.82 0.29 1.95 0.32
Hourly Wage 6.99 2.36 8.37 2.85 6.40 1.82 7.38 2.46
BMI 23.15 3.63 25.34 3.38 24.45 4.13 25.80 3.65
Height 166.51 5.96 177.69 7.09 164.84 6.30 178.09 6.63
Weight 64.19 10.69 80.04 11.95 66.42 11.59 81.97 13.34
Sickness 0.87 3.31 0.78 3.14 1.96 5.50 1.04 3.64
Training 0.56 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.79 0.41 0.71 0.45
Private 0.67 0.47 0.75 0.43 0.48 0.50 0.72 0.45
Insurance 0.18 0.38 0.23 0.42 0.86 0.35 0.84 0.37
Age 36.00 10.66 37.76 10.59 41.49 10.13 39.85 10.29
Couple 0.52 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.44
Children 0.19 0.39 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.47
Primary 0.26 0.44 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37 0.18 0.39
Secondary 0.64 0.48 0.76 0.43 0.39 0.49 0.48 0.50
Tertiary 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.47
Bad Health 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.21 0.12 0.33
Smoker 0.28 0.45 0.40 0.49 0.21 0.41 0.30 0.46
Professionals 0.29 0.46 0.29 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.42 0.49
Clerks 0.53 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.33 0.47 0.10 0.30
AgrFishery 0.05 0.22 0.33 0.47 0.04 0.19 0.23 0.42
Elementary 0.12 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.08 0.27 0.18 0.38
Agriculture 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13
Industry 0.19 0.39 0.47 0.50 0.09 0.29 0.29 0.46
Services 0.80 0.40 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.33 0.47
OBS. 2,653 5,271 4,930 5,176
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Table A-4: Descriptive Statistics by Country, Restricted Sample
Denmark Belgium Ireland Italy
Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log
Hourly Wage 2.12 0.26 2.18 0.32 2.02 0.29 2.12 0.33 2.01 0.42 2.15 0.44 1.92 0.41 1.97 0.37
Hourly Wage 8.56 2.10 9.23 2.79 7.89 2.25 8.80 2.93 8.14 3.83 9.45 4.57 7.44 3.97 7.81 3.98
BMI 24.27 3.94 25.44 3.49 22.74 3.63 25.45 3.59 23.66 3.85 25.14 3.41 22.63 3.43 25.24 3.11
bBMI 24.58 3.48 24.70 3.64 24.42 3.23 23.91 3.37 24.60 2.91 24.40 2.90 24.42 3.30 24.04 3.10
Height 166.82 5.75 179.54 6.59 165.25 6.02 177.84 6.75 164.42 6.71 176.89 7.50 162.73 6.54 173.80 6.97
Weight 67.56 11.50 82.11 12.87 62.00 9.78 80.46 12.01 63.85 10.37 78.66 11.79 59.82 8.98 76.22 10.34
Sickness 1.82 4.93 0.89 3.02 1.61 5.07 1.32 4.49 1.10 4.20 0.39 2.10 1.02 3.91 0.62 2.85
Training 0.89 0.32 0.77 0.42 0.64 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37
Private 0.46 0.50 0.75 0.43 0.33 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.52 0.50 0.68 0.47
Insurance 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.38 0.47 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.11 0.32 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.39 0.24 0.43
Age 40.10 10.94 40.96 11.84 37.09 9.65 39.65 9.94 33.71 10.41 35.61 11.73 37.87 10.15 39.29 10.81
Couple 0.94 0.24 0.91 0.29 0.79 0.41 0.83 0.37 0.47 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.69 0.46
Children 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48
Primary 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46 0.51 0.50
Secondary 0.58 0.49 0.55 0.50 0.29 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.45 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.39 0.49
Tertiary 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.60 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.22 0.42 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.31
Bad Health 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.18
Smoker 0.35 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.19 0.39 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.22 0.42 0.37 0.48
Professionals 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.39
Clerks 0.45 0.50 0.10 0.29 0.26 0.44 0.10 0.30 0.42 0.49 0.16 0.36 0.42 0.50 0.25 0.43
AgrFishery 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.41 0.11 0.31 0.27 0.44
Elementary 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.42 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.34 0.18 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.11 0.32 0.23 0.42
Agriculture 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.21
Industry 0.09 0.29 0.32 0.47 0.09 0.29 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.44 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.40 0.49
Service 0.71 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.79 0.40 0.52 0.50 0.71 0.45 0.51 0.50
OBS. 827 1040 850 1488 1160 2110 2239 4281
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Table A-4: Descriptive Statistics by Country, Restricted Sample (ctd.)
Greece Spain Portugal
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log
Hourly Wage 1.44 0.66 1.52 0.77 1.77 0.50 1.91 0.49 1.42 0.56 1.61 0.56
Hourly Wage 5.14 3.10 5.84 3.83 6.70 3.56 7.68 4.66 4.96 3.61 5.99 4.44
BMI 23.33 3.69 25.72 3.09 23.13 3.55 25.94 3.39 24.04 4.63 25.28 3.19
bBMI 25.08 3.22 24.71 3.09 24.93 3.31 25.07 3.58 24.84 3.20 24.68 3.07
Height 164.64 5.79 175.93 6.89 163.13 6.15 173.52 7.22 161.46 6.06 171.09 6.73
Weight 63.15 9.78 79.63 10.75 61.53 9.83 78.08 10.90 62.39 10.51 73.99 10.15
Sickness 0.67 2.88 0.62 2.63 0.77 3.68 0.75 3.68 0.98 4.28 0.82 3.85
Training 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39
Private 0.59 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.78 0.41 0.79 0.41 0.87 0.34
Insurance 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.32 0.47
Age 36.00 9.56 39.28 10.94 35.24 9.57 38.30 11.08 35.02 10.76 36.41 11.73
Couple 0.66 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.55 0.50 0.68 0.47 0.60 0.49 0.62 0.49
Children 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47
Primary 0.22 0.41 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.65 0.48 0.67 0.47
Secondary 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.38
Tertiary 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.39 0.49 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.36
Bad Health 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.20
Smoker 0.33 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.32 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.15 0.36 0.38 0.49
Professionals 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.47 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.40 0.17 0.37
Clerks 0.46 0.50 0.27 0.44 0.40 0.49 0.19 0.40 0.32 0.47 0.18 0.39
AgrFishery 0.08 0.27 0.24 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.28 0.45 0.20 0.40 0.37 0.48
Elementary 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.30 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.28 0.45
Agriculture 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15
Industry 0.18 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.19 0.39 0.44 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.56 0.50
Services 0.81 0.39 0.67 0.47 0.79 0.41 0.51 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.42 0.49
OBS. 1333 2295 1863 3611 2094 3420
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Table A-4: Descriptive Statistics by Country, Restricted Sample (ctd.)
Austria Finland
Women Men Women Men
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Log Hourly Wage 1.58 0.58 1.65 0.57 1.81 0.38 2.03 0.37
Hourly Wage 5.85 3.98 6.29 4.75 6.53 2.23 8.07 2.84
BMI 24.62 4.43 25.85 2.98 23.08 3.72 25.48 3.43
bBMI 24.90 3.26 25.16 3.96 25.21 3.20 24.17 3.12
Height 159.55 5.62 170.51 6.35 166.39 6.02 176.88 7.34
Weight 62.65 11.44 75.21 9.98 63.89 10.71 79.68 11.33
Sickness 0.97 3.95 0.61 3.18 0.75 2.96 0.68 2.90
Training 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.50
Private 0.59 0.49 0.78 0.41 0.69 0.46 0.78 0.42
Insurance 0.14 0.34 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40
Age 37.54 10.55 37.83 10.84 35.16 10.40 38.11 10.70
Couple 0.65 0.48 0.71 0.45 0.61 0.49 0.70 0.46
Children 0.30 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.21 0.41 0.38 0.49
Primary 0.47 0.50 0.68 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.18 0.38
Secondary 0.25 0.43 0.16 0.37 0.59 0.49 0.75 0.43
Tertiary 0.28 0.45 0.16 0.37 0.07 60.25 0.06 0.23
Bad Health 0.08 0.26 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Smoker 0.12 0.33 0.38 0.48 0.24 0.42 0.38 0.49
Professionals 0.32 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44
Clerks 0.38 0.49 0.22 0.41 0.53 0.50 0.19 0.39
AgrFishery 0.05 0.22 0.24 0.43 0.06 0.24 0.35 0.48
Elementary 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
Agriculture 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.12
Industry 0.12 0.32 0.35 0.48 0.20 0.40 0.51 0.50
Services 0.81 0.39 0.57 0.50 0.79 0.41 0.47 0.50
OBS. 1239 2012 989 2017
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample
Denmark
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.046** -0.051** -0.037** -0.049*** -0.046*** 0.027 0.029 0.039** 0.023 0.042*
Insurance 0.020* 0.018 0.018 0.022* 0.022* 0.055** 0.047*** 0.031** 0.023* 0.040**
Training 0.045*** 0.020 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.018 0.027* 0.012 0.011 0.019
Sickness 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
Bad Health -0.088** -0.029 -0.024 -0.071 -0.077** -0.249*** -0.143* -0.089* -0.125*** -0.158***
Age 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.030***
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private 0.030** 0.020* 0.032*** 0.071*** 0.094*** 0.050*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.097*** 0.097***
Couple 0.076*** 0.050*** 0.048*** 0.014 0.018* 0.160*** 0.102*** 0.056*** 0.032* 0.026
Children 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.020* 0.031** 0.019* 0.011 0.004 0.021 0.033** 0.037**
Secondary 0.144*** 0.117*** 0.098*** 0.042** 0.027* 0.112*** 0.109*** 0.120*** 0.109*** 0.112***
Tertiary 0.260*** 0.232*** 0.179*** 0.114*** 0.103*** 0.219*** 0.204*** 0.209*** 0.179*** 0.176***
Smoker 0.004 -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.026* -0.025** -0.002 -0.003
Clerks -0.100*** -0.091*** -0.102*** -0.110*** -0.128*** -0.090*** -0.112*** -0.135*** -0.168*** -0.167***
AgrFishery -0.205*** -0.072* -0.126*** -0.101** -0.132*** -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.142*** -0.185*** -0.197***
Elementary -0.126*** -0.138*** -0.169*** -0.206*** -0.234*** -0.130*** -0.153*** -0.166*** -0.190*** -0.191***
Agriculture 0.008 -0.084* -0.108* -0.200*** -0.151*** -0.093** -0.015 -0.042 -0.043 -0.021
Industry -0.027 -0.009 0.007 -0.015 -0.035** 0.026 0.014 0.016 0.023* 0.020
Constant 0.506*** 0.878*** 1.197*** 1.344*** 1.341*** 0.041 0.229*** 0.968*** 1.305*** 1.506***
OBS. 3,268 4,032
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Belgium
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.009 -0.020 -0.049 -0.014 0.011 0.019 0.030 0.004 -0.031 -0.043*
Insurance 0.073*** 0.040** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.063*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.076***
Training 0.093*** 0.104*** 0.075*** 0.050*** 0.052** 0.070*** 0.097*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.064***
Sickness -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
Bad Health -0.022 -0.106** -0.089 -0.034 -0.028 -0.048 -0.076* -0.059* -0.092* -0.078*
Age 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.011* 0.013**
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 0.000 0.000
Private 0.013 0.004 0.002 -0.012 -0.003 0.003 -0.021 -0.027* -0.011 -0.013
Couple -0.010 -0.027* 0.002 -0.022 -0.018 0.085*** 0.065*** 0.089*** 0.092*** 0.085***
Children 0.015 0.044*** 0.027 0.038*** 0.032* -0.001 0.014 0.010 0.019 0.026*
Secondary 0.055** 0.076*** 0.069*** 0.083*** 0.068** 0.050* 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.070*** 0.070***
Tertiary 0.167*** 0.162*** 0.178*** 0.224*** 0.210*** 0.151*** 0.166*** 0.192*** 0.243*** 0.255***
Smoker -0.026 -0.041** -0.044** -0.045*** -0.056*** -0.021 -0.005 0.002 -0.005 -0.019
Clerk -0.066*** -0.079*** -0.093*** -0.086*** -0.098*** -0.088** -0.092*** -0.084*** -0.075*** -0.066***
AgrFishery -0.128* -0.173** -0.137* -0.084 -0.166* -0.144*** -0.133*** -0.096*** -0.074** -0.089***
Elementary -0.152*** -0.171*** -0.146*** -0.133*** -0.152*** -0.114** -0.064** -0.068*** -0.035 -0.038
Agriculture 0.007 -0.058 0.152 0.051 -0.042 -0.069 -0.125* -0.217*** -0.233** -0.282***
Industry -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.025 0.074** 0.071*** 0.049*** 0.019 0.041*
Constant 0.715*** 0.979*** 1.171*** 1.128*** 1.240*** 1.046*** 1.096*** 1.350*** 1.525*** 1.558***
OBS. 2,559 4,012
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Ireland
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.104** -0.064* -0.066** -0.045 -0.033 -0.004 -0.009 0.021 0.022 0.048
Insurance 0.109*** 0.088*** 0.049** 0.004 0.016 0.079*** 0.060* 0.069*** 0.078*** 0.091***
Training 0.032 0.038* 0.045*** 0.064** 0.010 0.042* 0.051* 0.007 -0.002 0.011
Sickness -0.005* -0.003 -0.006*** -0.005* -0.005* -0.001 -0.004 -0.006** -0.003 -0.004
Bad Health 0.003 -0.095 -0.040 0.160* 0.059 0.074 0.048 -0.029 0.001 -0.080
Age 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.031***
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private -0.212*** -0.187*** -0.213*** -0.229*** -0.271*** -0.261*** -0.242*** -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.178***
Couple -0.029 -0.019 -0.015 -0.005 -0.015 0.165*** 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.096*** 0.104***
Children 0.012 0.021 0.065*** 0.052* 0.091*** -0.023 -0.021 0.001 0.017 0.014
Secondary 0.145*** 0.153*** 0.180*** 0.179*** 0.168*** 0.053** 0.071*** 0.094*** 0.100*** 0.110***
Tertiary 0.274*** 0.280*** 0.311*** 0.292*** 0.291*** 0.220*** 0.230*** 0.303*** 0.316*** 0.332***
Smoker 0.027 0.011 -0.015 -0.017 -0.012 -0.022 -0.033 -0.018 0.005 0.024
Clerk -0.179*** -0.190*** -0.221*** -0.267*** -0.294*** -0.140*** -0.164*** -0.176*** -0.177*** -0.176***
AgrFishery -0.204*** -0.106 -0.157** -0.321*** -0.256*** -0.185*** -0.193*** -0.165*** -0.165*** -0.157***
Elementary -0.174*** -0.203*** -0.238*** -0.338*** -0.339*** -0.210*** -0.218*** -0.221*** -0.234*** -0.221***
Agriculture -0.657*** -0.383*** 0.029 -0.053 -0.155 -0.501*** -0.375*** -0.146*** -0.039 -0.063
Industry 0.081*** 0.040 0.067*** 0.114*** 0.091*** 0.151*** 0.147*** 0.131*** 0.122*** 0.106***
Constant 0.864*** 0.842*** 1.256*** 1.508*** 1.639*** 0.906*** 1.158*** 1.370*** 1.570*** 1.615***
OBS. 2,286 3,908
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Italy
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.067* -0.044 -0.031 -0.049 -0.071** -0.068** -0.063*** -0.042*** -0.040* -0.029
Insurance -0.030* -0.030** -0.009 0.005 0.034** -0.000 0.006 0.016* 0.015 0.022*
Training 0.115*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.082*** 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.091*** 0.084*** 0.072***
Sickness -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* 0.000
Bad Health 0.099*** 0.064** 0.068*** 0.060 0.042 -0.066* -0.057** -0.091*** -0.076** -0.038
Age 0.063*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.019***
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private -0.131*** -0.119*** -0.096*** -0.050*** -0.031** -0.067*** -0.056*** -0.030*** -0.009 0.021*
Couple 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.039* 0.046*** 0.073*** 0.085*** 0.098***
Children 0.026* 0.023* 0.034*** 0.036** 0.049*** 0.033** 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.049***
Secondary 0.177*** 0.131*** 0.110*** 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.111*** 0.098*** 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.105***
Tertiary 0.284*** 0.256*** 0.304*** 0.443*** 0.447*** 0.235*** 0.247*** 0.310*** 0.447*** 0.505***
Smoker 0.019 0.010 0.007 0.017 0.026* -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.012 -0.005 0.011
Clerk -0.034* -0.068*** -0.125*** -0.244*** -0.275*** -0.037** -0.065*** -0.097*** -0.108*** -0.116***
AgrFishery -0.154*** -0.174*** -0.202*** -0.332*** -0.101*** -0.100*** -0.155*** -0.218*** -0.228*** -0.362***
Elementary -0.106*** -0.135*** -0.182*** -0.337*** -0.398*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.138*** -0.179*** -0.194***
Agriculture -0.401*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.138*** -0.179*** -0.194*** -0.100***
Industry 0.077*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.138*** -0.179*** -0.194*** 0.050*** 0.028* 0.025 0.009
Constant 0.184* 0.786*** 1.129*** 1.478*** 1.632*** 0.472*** 0.752*** 1.173*** 1.485*** 1.613***
OBS. 5,968 9,730
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Greece
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.023 -0.051* -0.049 0.012 0.009 -0.065** -0.042* -0.024 -0.029 -0.030
Insurance -0.017 -0.000 -0.006 0.004 0.004 0.035* 0.030* 0.020 -0.013 -0.010
Training 0.009 0.017 0.059** 0.048** 0.098*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.087*** 0.115*** 0.099***
Sickness 0.002 0.000 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.006* -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.000
Bad Health -0.235** -0.161** -0.177*** -0.161** -0.192** -0.157* -0.156** -0.150** -0.050 -0.113
Age 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.057*** 0.054*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.050*** 0.051** 0.052***
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private -0.219*** -0.239*** -0.242*** -0.246*** -0.208*** -0.217*** -0.189*** -0.138*** -0.101*** -0.060**
Couple 0.061** 0.036** 0.032* -0.004 0.027 0.119*** 0.100*** 0.065*** 0.064** 0.060*
Children 0.060** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.061*** 0.045* 0.035 0.055*** 0.074*** 0.084*** 0.081***
Secondary 0.157*** 0.166*** 0.136*** 0.111*** 0.126*** 0.134*** 0.130*** 0.158*** 0.133*** 0.124***
Tertiary 0.334*** 0.352*** 0.393*** 0.460*** 0.521*** 0.229*** 0.363*** 0.465*** 0.470*** 0.651***
Smoker 0.006 -0.007 -0.008 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.005 0.009 0.004
Clerks -0.078** -0.074*** -0.122*** -0.171*** -0.186*** -0.143*** -0.149*** -0.158*** -0.220*** -0.271***
AgrFishery -0.240*** -0.202*** -0.219*** -0.312*** -0.314*** -0.216*** -0.204*** -0.229*** -0.287*** -0.343***
Elementary -0.263*** -0.251*** -0.268*** -0.264*** -0.267*** -0.171*** -0.183*** -0.194*** -0.252*** -0.304***
Agriculture -0.182* -0.146*** -0.105* -0.048 -0.053 -0.105 -0.159*** -0.151*** -0.100* -0.147*
Industry 0.102*** 0.069*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.036 0.107*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.035* 0.036
Constant -0.145 -0.001 0.463*** 0.582*** 0.669*** 0.363*** 0.465*** 0.470*** 0.651*** 0.739***
OBS. 3,107 5,000
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Spain
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.105* -0.101** -0.087** -0.114*** -0.131*** -0.023 -0.051** -0.022 -0.016 0.002
Insurance 0.143*** 0.113*** 0.066*** 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.054***
Trainining 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.125*** 0.093*** 0.105*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 0.146*** 0.137*** 0.121***
Sickness 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Bad Health 0.035 0.019 -0.003 0.010 0.015 -0.069 -0.093* -0.133*** -0.138*** -0.164***
Age 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.026***
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**
Private -0.199*** -0.192*** -0.179*** -0.152*** -0.136*** -0.180*** -0.133*** -0.060*** 0.008 0.038*
Couple 0.054* 0.046* 0.056*** 0.022 0.067*** 0.091*** 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.066**
Children 0.067* 0.026 0.031* 0.019 -0.006 -0.007 0.018 0.016 0.021 0.033*
Secondary 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.153*** 0.160*** 0.124*** 0.119*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.130***
Tertiary 0.232*** 0.240*** 0.255*** 0.234*** 0.190*** 0.212*** 0.202*** 0.210*** 0.220*** 0.237***
Smoker 0.013 0.007 0.019 0.032* 0.020 -0.044** -0.034** -0.016 -0.023* -0.030*
Clerk -0.224*** -0.273*** -0.296*** -0.370*** -0.380*** -0.177*** -0.184*** -0.255*** -0.266*** -0.219***
AgrFishery -0.328*** -0.390*** -0.433*** -0.570*** -0.562*** -0.231*** -0.254*** -0.326*** -0.366*** -0.329***
Elementary -0.306*** -0.347*** -0.353*** -0.454*** -0.468*** -0.249*** -0.285*** -0.363*** -0.378*** -0.361***
Agriculture -0.016 -0.096 -0.122** -0.001 -0.005 -0.222*** -0.193*** -0.179*** -0.178*** -0.187***
Industry 0.142*** 0.110*** 0.131*** 0.142*** 0.120*** 0.183*** 0.149*** 0.109*** 0.071*** 0.041**
Constant 0.276 0.516*** 0.833*** 1.132*** 1.372*** 0.565*** 0.794*** 1.207*** 1.504*** 1.507***
OBS. 4,457 8,636
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Portugal
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity 0.010 -0.001 -0.025 -0.035 0.022 -0.072*** -0.006 0.008 0.024 -0.015
Insurance 0.040** 0.033*** 0.022 0.036** 0.044*** 0.038* 0.066*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.140***
Training 0.066*** 0.090*** 0.135*** 0.152*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.136*** 0.131*** 0.121*** 0.123***
Sickness -0.003* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.002
Bad Health 0.007 -0.002 -0.034 -0.084*** -0.103*** -0.123*** -0.119*** -0.107*** -0.135*** -0.146***
Age 0.006 0.009*** 0.011** 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.040***
Age Squared -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private -0.279*** -0.274*** -0.225*** -0.147*** -0.130*** -0.106*** -0.057*** -0.060*** -0.021 -0.022
Couple 0.070*** 0.046*** 0.047** 0.005 -0.032** 0.088*** 0.097*** 0.110*** 0.146*** 0.179***
Children 0.006 -0.002 -0.024 -0.008 0.025* 0.011 0.013 0.018 0.019 0.000
Secondary 0.111*** 0.131*** 0.207*** 0.300*** 0.346*** 0.101*** 0.112*** 0.191*** 0.180*** 0.143***
Tertiary 0.534*** 0.531*** 0.605*** 0.640*** 0.640*** 0.543*** 0.616*** 0.655*** 0.682*** 0.643***
Smoker 0.062*** 0.075*** 0.124*** 0.129*** 0.108*** -0.023 -0.029** -0.031* -0.022 -0.011
Clerks -0.256*** -0.281*** -0.322*** -0.336*** -0.318*** -0.217*** -0.229*** -0.226*** -0.191*** -0.205***
AgrFishery -0.277*** -0.343*** -0.405*** -0.510*** -0.533*** -0.209*** -0.215*** -0.277*** -0.278*** -0.268***
Elementary -0.308*** -0.366*** -0.426*** -0.469*** -0.458*** -0.259*** -0.248*** -0.284*** -0.295*** -0.331***
Agriculture -0.035 -0.005 -0.090* -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.309*** -0.255*** -0.217*** -0.109* -0.160**
Industry 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.048** 0.092*** 0.059** 0.071*** 0.032** -0.004 -0.035 -0.060**
Constant 1.133*** 1.184*** 1.280*** 1.170*** 1.139*** 0.620*** 0.660*** 0.801*** 0.807*** 0.913***
OBS. 5,981 8,229
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Austria
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity 0.029 0.021 -0.020 0.068* 0.038* 0.009 0.027* 0.042** 0.041* 0.043*
Insurance 0.031 0.074*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.087*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.109*** 0.105***
Training 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.049*** 0.013 0.015 0.059*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.043**
Sickness -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.005**
Bad Health 0.039 0.021 0.047 -0.029 -0.021 -0.046 -0.053 -0.086* -0.010 0.123**
Age 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.024*** 0.017*** 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.013**
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000
Private -0.083*** -0.059*** -0.054*** -0.042* -0.058*** 0.021 0.052*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.045**
Couple -0.029 -0.029** -0.010 0.022 0.028** 0.010 0.006 0.058*** 0.026* 0.037*
Children -0.067** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.045* -0.037** -0.009 0.000 -0.025* -0.007 -0.002
Secondary 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.053*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.096*** 0.109***
Tertiary 0.107** 0.149*** 0.140*** 0.067* 0.057** 0.204*** 0.230*** 0.241*** 0.309*** 0.402***
Smoker 0.024 0.011 0.026** 0.011 0.007 -0.053*** -0.029*** -0.015 -0.024* -0.014
Clerks -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.153*** -0.227*** -0.239*** -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.189*** -0.140*** -0.130***
AgrFishery -0.210*** -0.251*** -0.335*** -0.477*** -0.465*** -0.147*** -0.172*** -0.194*** -0.208*** -0.201***
Elementary -0.278*** -0.286*** -0.338*** -0.482*** -0.500*** -0.230*** -0.276*** -0.278*** -0.276*** -0.301***
Agriculture 0.057 0.048 0.014 -0.019 -0.071 -0.242*** -0.118*** -0.092** -0.079* -0.145*
Industry 0.036 0.065*** 0.089*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.054*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.043**
Constant 0.648*** 0.901*** 1.073*** 1.516*** 1.704*** 0.812*** 1.042*** 1.408*** 1.601*** 1.740***
OBS. 2,688 5,257
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Table A-5: Quantile Regressions by Country, Unrestricted Sample (ctd)
Finland
Women Men
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th) α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Obesity -0.077*** -0.039** -0.046*** -0.034* -0.042** -0.039* -0.014 0.011 0.009 0.021
Insurance 0.131*** 0.093*** 0.066*** 0.057*** 0.070*** 0.153*** 0.114*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 0.052**
Training 0.140*** 0.104*** 0.082*** 0.073*** 0.050*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.086*** 0.100*** 0.115***
Sickness -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
Bad Health -0.007 -0.005 -0.013 0.027 0.060** -0.010 -0.018 -0.010 0.012 0.018
Age 0.049*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.030***
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
Private 0.009 0.012 0.025** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.005 0.012 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*
Couple 0.010 -0.016 -0.011 -0.018 -0.024* 0.066*** 0.040* 0.041** 0.015 0.018
Children 0.010 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.016 0.038** 0.033 0.011 0.010 0.005
Secondary 0.031 0.021 0.028* 0.010 0.017 0.059*** 0.057** 0.047** 0.039** 0.055**
Tertiary 0.158*** 0.133*** 0.144*** 0.170*** 0.212*** 0.169*** 0.167*** 0.186*** 0.193*** 0.218***
Smoker 0.010 0.004 0.001 -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 -0.010 -0.023* -0.028** -0.031*
Clerks -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.103*** -0.137*** -0.127*** -0.129*** -0.121*** -0.131*** -0.169*** -0.154***
AgrFishery -0.146*** -0.153*** -0.145*** -0.156*** -0.173*** -0.065*** -0.090*** -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.118***
Elementary -0.114*** -0.157*** -0.190*** -0.209*** -0.214*** -0.111*** -0.119*** -0.139*** -0.117*** -0.089***
Agriculture -0.027 0.004 -0.017 -0.014 -0.005 -0.025 -0.072 -0.057 -0.099** -0.121**
Industry 0.020 0.022 0.011 0.030 0.050** 0.022 0.023 0.019 0.011 0.025
Constant 0.235* 0.657*** 1.028*** 1.301*** 1.317*** 0.722*** 0.876*** 1.033*** 1.207*** 1.185***
OBS. 5,024 5,159
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Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample
Denmark
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity 0.068 0.039 0.003 -0.041 -0.070**
Sickness 0.002* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Training 0.051*** 0.039*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.050***
Insurance 0.021** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.027***
Sickness interaction -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001
Training interaction -0.110** -0.091** -0.036 0.019 0.043
Insurance interaction -0.003 -0.030 -0.082*** -0.090** -0.062**
Men
Obesity 0.021 0.050 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
Sickness 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.002*
Training 0.017 0.033* 0.009 0.009 0.015
Insurance 0.052*** 0.042** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.044***
Sickness interaction -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.001
Training interaction -0.002 -0.047 0.035 0.051* 0.083**
Insurance interaction 0.045 0.045 0.036 -0.042 -0.091**
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Belgium
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.124*** -0.136*** -0.053 -0.065 -0.080
Sickness 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002*
Training 0.097*** 0.109*** 0.078*** 0.051*** 0.051***
Insurance 0.060*** 0.034*** 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.065***
Sickness interaction 0.005 0.004* 0.006 0.009*** 0.005*
Training interaction -0.122** -0.044 -0.133** -0.069 0.005
Insurance interaction 0.264*** 0.188*** 0.125** 0.107 0.096*
Men
Obesity 0.042 0.019 -0.002 -0.050* -0.063*
Sickness 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
Training 0.067*** 0.093*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.059
Insurance 0.084*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.062***
Sickness interaction -0.026*** -0.012*** -0.004 -0.005* -0.003
Training interaction 0.009 0.022 -0.019 -0.042 -0.060
Insurance interaction 0.000 0.038 0.053* 0.117*** 0.133***
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
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Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Ireland
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.067 -0.038 -0.061* -0.138*** -0.118**
Sickness -0.006** -0.002* -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005**
Training 0054* 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.003
Insurance 0.080** 0.074*** 0.035* 0.006 0.020
Sickness interaction -0.001 -0.005 -0.011* -0.015*** -0.019***
Training interaction -0.062 -0.044 0.028 0.205*** 0.245***
Insurance interaction 0.040 -0.047 -0.020 -0.086 -0.230***
Men
Obesity 0.013 -0.015 -0.007 0.007 0.006
Sickness -0.002 -0.005* -0.007** -0.003 -0.004
Training 0.027 0.045** 0.005 -0.000 0.006
Insurance 0.096*** 0.062** 0.071*** 0.077*** 0.071***
Sickness interaction 0.002 0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.007
Training interaction 0.075 0.086 0.079 0.014 0.042
Insurance interaction -0.146** -0.108 -0.025 0.108 0.089*
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Italy
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.112*** 0.051 -0.018 -0.041 -0.034
Sickness -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
Training 0.108*** 0.090*** 0.104*** 0.111*** 0.088***
Insurance -0.026** -0.024** -0.006 0.009 0.036***
Sickness interaction -0.000 -0.006 -0.009** 0.000 -0.002
Training interaction 0.105 0.071 0.020 -0.024 -0.029
Insurance interaction -0.048 0.012 -0.055 -0.013 -0.085*
Men
Obesity -0.097*** -0.057*** -0.043*** -0.054*** -0.055***
Sickness -0.000 -0.002 -0.002* -0.003** -0.000
Training 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.071***
Insurance 0.004 0.009 0.018** 0.015 0.018*
Sickness interaction -0.000 -0.002 -0.002* -0.003* -0.000
Training interaction 0.071 0.020 -0.005 0.046 0.031
Insurance interaction -0.059 -0.040 -0.006 0.017 0.058*
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
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Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Greece
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.027 -0.063*** -0.010 0.046 0.033
Sickness 0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.001
Training 0.016 0.020 0.056*** 0.044** 0.094***
Insurance -0.010 -0.006 0.004 0.012 0.015
Sickness interaction 0.007 0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
Training interaction -0.083 -0.050 0.021 0.100 0.029
Insurance interaction -0.013 -0.008 -0.093* -0.158*** -0.078*
Men
Obesity -0.088*** -0.064*** -0.050** -0.040 -0.044
Sickness -0.005** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.002
Training 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.085*** 0.114*** 0.097***
Insurance 0.033** 0.025** 0.017 -0.011 -0.011
Sickness interaction -0.000 -0.014** 0.001 0.006 0.003
Training interaction -0.019 0.022 0.074 0.068 -0.045
Insurance interaction 0.081** 0.029 0.021 -0.037 0.054
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Spain
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.171*** -0.133** -0.084* -0.110** -0.128***
Sickness 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
Training 0.111*** 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.088*** 0.103***
Insurance 0.147*** 0.108*** 0.061*** 0.075*** 0.050***
Sickness interaction -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.001
Training interaction 0.092 0.011 -0.077 -0.034 -0.111
Insurance interaction 0.047 0.054 0.023 0.001 0.001
Men
Obesity -0.024 -0.061** -0.038* -0.025 -0.005
Sickness -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
Training 0.120*** 0.114*** 0.143*** 0.136*** 0.126***
Insurance 0.053*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 0.052*** 0.049***
Sickness interaction 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.000
Training interaction 0.022 0.058 0.002 0.016 -0.051
Insurance interaction -0.015 0.009 0.036 0.016 0.052
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
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Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Portugal
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.017 0.006 -0.028 0.013 0.054***
Sickness -0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
Training 0.077*** 0.099*** 0.136*** 0.162*** 0.134***
Insurance 0.017 0.006 -0.028 0.013 0.054***
Sickness interaction -0.001 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003 -0.005***
Training interaction 0.042 -0.018 -0.037 -0.085* -0.112***
Insurance interaction 0.064 0.022 0.025 0.050 -0.020
Men
Obesity -0.012 0.059*** 0.026 0.017 -0.050
Sickness 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003* 0.001
Training 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.145*** 0.123*** 0.125***
Insurance 0.048** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.077*** 0.100***
Sickness interaction 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.010** -0.010*
Training interaction -0.192*** -0.070 -0.050 -0.008 -0.003
Insurance interaction -0.087 -0.158*** 0.001 0.126** 0.263**
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Austria
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity 0.098** 0.060** 0.019 0.071* 0.032
Sickness 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002
Training 0.083*** 0.069*** 0.054*** 0.018 0.017*
Insurance 0.029 0.070*** 0.103*** 0.095*** 0.100***
Sickness interaction -0.005 -0.009** -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.026***
Training interaction -0.161** -0.088* -0.077** -0.017 -0.001
Insurance interaction 0.095 0.056 0.080* 0.164** 0.141***
Men
Obesity -0.011 0.008 0.015 0.044* 0.065**
Sickness -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.005***
Training 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.048***
Insurance 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.101*** 0.116*** 0.108***
Sickness interaction -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Training interaction 0.041 0.015 0.059** 0.026 -0.025
Insurance interaction 0.014 0.038 -0.023 -0.067* -0.058
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
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Table A-6: Quantile Regressions with Interactions by Country, Unrestricted
Sample (ctd)
Finland
α(15th) α(25th) α(50th) α(75th) α(85th)
Women
Obesity -0.219*** -0.181*** -0.130*** -0.151*** -0.151***
Sickness -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
Training 0.146*** 0.104*** 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.045***
Insurance 0.107*** 0.075*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.068***
Sickness interaction -0.007** -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003
Training interaction -0.006 0.041 0.022 0.011 0.063*
Insurance interaction 0.168** 0.117*** 0.077* 0.114*** 0.052
Men
Obesity -0.018 0.035 0.022 0.003 0.020
Sickness -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
Training 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 0.103*** 0.110***
Insurance 0.151*** 0.121*** 0.079*** 0.070*** 0.054***
Sickness interaction 0.006*** 0.004 0.001 -0.000 0.000
Training interaction -0.011 -0.011 -0.020 -0.012 0.043
Insurance interaction -0.028 -0.062 0.001 0.015 -0.028
Symbols: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;* significant at 10%.
Notes: Control variables are as in Table 2.
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Table A-7: Trade Union Density, Bargaining Governability and EPL
Union Density Bargaining EPL
Governability Strictness
Austria 37% 3 2.3
Belgium 56% 1 2.5
Denmark 74% 4 1.5
Finland 76% 4 2.1
Greece 27% (a) 3.5
Ireland 38% 1 1.1
Italy 35% 1 3.4
Portugal 24% 3 3.7
Spain 15% 3 3.1
Notes: Trade union density is defined as the proportion of the labor force belonging to a trade union
(for details see OECD 2004). Bargaining governability is an indicator of vertical co-ordination and
is a measure of the extent to which collective contracts are effectively followed at lower levels. This
indicator assumes the following values: 4 when collective agreement are legally enforceable and there is an
automatic peace obligation during the validity of the agreement; 3 when collective agreement are legally
enforceable and there are widespread but optional peace of obligation clauses in agreements; 2 when
there is legal enforceability, but no effective tradition or practice of peace of obligation clauses; 1 when
neither of the above conditions are effectively present. For further detail on bargaining governability, see
OECD (2004) and Traxler et al. (2001). The EPL is a summary indicator, obtained as weighted average
of three main components: protection against individual dismissal of a regular employee, protection
against individual dismissal of a temporary employee and protection against collective dismissals. For
further details on EPL see OECD (1999).
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